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The critical accounting project has largely shunned quantitative methods. While this is partly 
justified on philosophical grounds, the potential for quantitative methods to contribute to the 
critical accounting project is significant. This paper reviews the position of quantitative methods 
within critical theory and attempts to reclaim quantitative methods as a legitimate form of critical 
accounting research. The paper then identifies some aspects of the untapped potential of 
quantitative methods for the critical accounting project including exploring the vast unexplained 
variance in market models, developing alternative dependent variables for analysis, providing 






The critical accounting project is relatively amorphous drawing on a host of theoretical 
perspectives ranging from Marxism and the critical rationalism of Jurgen Habermas to literary 
theory and deconstruction (Lodh and Gaffikin 1997; Laughlin, 1999). A common trait of the 
critical accounting literature, however, is its focus on qualitative methods and eschewing 
conventional, i.e. commercial, data sources. Some have in fact claimed that qualitative methods 
define the critical accounting project2. For example, Laughlin (1995: 80) describes empirical 
work associated with critical accounting theories as “invariably qualitative.” Similarly, Lodh and 
Gaffikin (1997: 435) suggest that the critical accounting project has “the primary objective of 
challenging ‘positivist’ epistemology” and Gaffikin (2006: 5) describes “alternative” research in 
accounting as employing “qualitative rather than quantitative research methodologies and this is 
sometimes taken as a defining characteristic”. 
 
This essay makes three arguments seriatim: first, that the critical accounting project, and Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting (CPA) in particular, has emphasized qualitative methods to the point 
of making the rejection of quantitative methods an article of faith; second, that this 
methodological preference is not an inherent aspect of critical theory more broadly which is 
aligned with pragmatism in its willingness to use any method that advances the principles of 
critical theory; and, finally, that there is significant potential to advance the critical accounting 
project using quantitative methods. The methods bias of the critical accounting project has 
opened the door for “critical” topics to be addressed in the “mainstream” literature using 
quantitative methods but the approach to framing questions and the interpretation of these results 
may not meet the objectives of the critical accounting project or the basic postulates of critical 
theory (Ciancanelli, 1998). It may be time for critical accounting researchers to reconsider the 
use of quantitative methods or at least to adopt mixed methods, i.e. combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods, to sustain and expand the critical accounting project.  
Defining critical accounting research 
 
The concept of “critical accounting” emerged from the interdisciplinary approach to accounting 
research in the 1970s that attempted to incorporate non-economic theories and non-positivist 
methods into the exploration of “the behavioural, organizational and social aspects of 
accounting” (Hopwood, 1976: 4). The interdisciplinary approach is closely associated with the 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference and the journal Accounting, 
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 To the extent that the critical accounting project is based on ontological rather than epistemological claims, it has 
been suggested that critical accounting should not be defined as this would require an essence that would violate 
the underlying assumptions of the project. From this view, a definition could construct the critical accounting 
project in a particular instance but never define it as an objective entity (Laughlin, 1999). My concern is with the 
practice of critical accounting researchers, not the definition of the critical accounting project. 
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Organizations and Society. The critical accounting project emerged in this same time period 
drawing on Marxist social theory as a basis for critiquing accounting practice and the modes of 
research that dominated North American academic accounting journals (Lowe and Tinker, 1975; 
Lowe et al., 1983). A commonality of the interdisciplinary and critical accounting projects is a 
relative openness to a wide range of theories and methods. This openness makes both the 
interdisciplinary and critical accounting projects difficult to define or to put boundaries around 
(Lodh and Gaffikin, 1997) but Roslender and Dillard (2003: 325) suggest that critical accounting 
can be seen as: 
 “a subset of the interdisciplinary project and provides a focus for those who wish to 
devise an approach that consciously privileges the linkage of knowledge to the pursuit of 
a radical political process”.  
The idea of a “radical political process3” reflects the intent of early “critical theory” and it is less 
common to see this aspect in more recent critical scholarship particularly in accounting (Moore, 
1991). The original meaning of “critical theory” derives from the “Frankfurt School” of social 
studies and philosophy (notably the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas) and 
refers to studies that seek human emancipation in the face of systematic oppression or 
domination. The revised use of the term “critical theory” refers to a broad group of studies that 
focus on identity-based oppression/domination associated with race, religion, gender etc. Unlike 
the original version of critical theory that had a normative agenda focusing on the achievement 
of pluralism, democracy and communicative rationality, the broader critical literature focuses on 
exposing the contradictions and interests inherent in social institutions without explicitly tying 
these observations to a process of social change or a normative model of society4.  
In spite of the variations in the definition of “critical theory,” and differences between 
generations of scholarship, certain basic principles of critical theory may be identified. Critical 
theory assumes that society is a human construction that can be consciously (reflexively) 
changed to achieve certain normative ends: knowledge of what currently exists in society says 
nothing about what might be. Critical theory privileges the perspective of the actor in the 
construction of knowledge; i.e. it is concerned with the meaning of events, not just their material 
characteristics, and it emphasizes the practices that reproduce society and the individual’s 
experience within it. Critical theory asserts that knowledge is context and value contingent 
(Ngwenyama, 1991; Kinchloe and McLaren, 1994). 
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 I use the term “critical accounting project” but this literature has also been referred to as the “critical accounting 
movement” which perhaps better reflects its connection to an agenda of social change. 
4
 This was a key aspect of the rancorous debate between Habermas and Derrida but at the turn of the century they 
reconciled and engaged in some joint work that bridged this divide (Habermas and Derrida, 2003); at least with 
respect to certain specific social issues. 
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The creation of Critical Perspectives on Accounting in 1990 reflects these themes with several 
references to the importance of practice, morality and emancipation in its inaugural editorial. But 
what also comes through is a distinct concern with method. The editorial, for example, highlights 
the “fetish for COMPUSTAT and statistical intricacy” in the mainstream literature, the 
“disingenuous pretensions of positivism” as a replacement for normative thought, and the “fog of 
statistics” that makes academic work inaccessible. The editors suggest that:  
“…the mainstream now pursues an impoverished and value-laden notion of science that 
elevates empiricism and technique as "objective," and denigrates ethical and social 
concerns as "normatively biased." A currency of arcane and incomprehensible trivia has 
driven out of the academy many thoughtful and reflective students and researchers. The 
relentless objective testing and a neurotic parrot learning of rules have frequently made 
"judgement," "reason," "common-sense" and "morality" anachronisms in university and 
professional education”. … “Most of all, we reject methodological secularism and 
academic obscurantism, and support new forms of dialogue and tolerance that encourages 
catholic, electic [sic] and interdisciplinary approaches. The only methodological 
endorsement we will make is that "anything and everything" should be open for 
"Critique."  
Given this framing of the critical accounting project, it is not surprizing that CPA should show 
little interest in papers using quantitative methods (or perhaps more accurately, there is a self-
selection of papers based on quantitative methods to other journals).  
Quantitative Methods as the Absent Presence in Critical Accounting 
 
Derrida (1982) developed the concept of “différance” to capture the idea that the presence of 
something often implies the absence of something else and that to understand the presence of 
something, one must also understand what is submerged or “deferred” in order to provide a space 
for what is present.  
 
“Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign 
without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving 
results in each ‘element’ – phoneme or grapheme – being constituted on the basis of the 
trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, 
is the text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among 
the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are 
only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces” (Derrida, 1981: 26). 
 
In many ways Critical Perspectives on Accounting is a reaction to forms of research that are 
missing from or deferred in the “mainstream” literature (Baker and Bettner, 1997) but the 
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“différance” has been reversed in CPA such that quantitative methods have become the absence 
that defines the presence of qualitative research. 
 
A search5 of 1584 entries on the web site of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, for example, 
found only 4 results for the search term COMPUSTAT, zero examples of CRSP and I/B/E/S 
(standard sources of market data and analyst data respectively), 14 references to “experimental 
design,” 5 results for the search term “ANOVA”, 25 examples of “regression” and 46 results for 
“correlation.” The term “statistical significance” appears only 4 times in this database. Even the 
small number of uses of “correlation” and “regression” may overstate the frequency of 
quantitative methods since these terms are frequently mentioned in review articles or articles on 
methodology rather than in the context of a particular study. 
 
To reinforce these findings, I reviewed all papers (567) published in CPA over the last decade 
(Issues 15-24) to identify the method used. I classified articles across four main categories: 
commentaries (including introductions to special issues, editorials, comments on other work and 
responses), non-empirical (including theoretical articles and literature reviews), qualitative 
methods (including case studies, ethnographies and historical work) and quantitative methods 
(including archival data analysis, surveys, and experiments). Where multiple methods were used, 
I classified the paper according to the dominant method. The pattern of articles over this decade 




The data clearly show the minority position of quantitative studies in CPA; the “mainstream” of 
the critical accounting project emphasizes case study methods and/or historical qualitative data 
(see Figure 2, Panel A). The data also show the importance of commentaries and non-empirical 
work in CPA. These articles capture a sense of community in the critical accounting project and 
reflect the commitment of the journal to ongoing discussion and self-criticism of research 
philosophy and results. 
 
Quantitative articles made up about 6% of the total articles published in CPA in this decade. The 
vast majority of these were survey-based empirical papers (69%); 25% of all quantitative papers 
(i.e. 9 papers over the full decade making up about 1.5% of the total articles published) were 
based on archival market data (see Figure 2, Panel B). The distinction between the sources of 
data and type of data used in CPA and the norm in traditional mainstream journals is beyond 
doubt (Baker and Bettner, 1997). 
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The data above support the premise that CPA, and by proxy the critical accounting project, has 
focused on qualitative methods. The question posed in this essay is what role quantitative 
analysis might play in the critical accounting project and why quantitative methods are largely 
absent from the critical accounting project. 
The caricature of the “mainstream” 
  
The critical accounting project is in some ways defined in opposition to the “mainstream” 
accounting literature (Chua, 1986). This is common among authors attempting to change the 
dominant approach to research in a field; even positive accounting theory initially positioned 
itself in opposition to the “mainstream” (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 149). In drawing the 
distinction between the old and the new, however, there is always a risk of caricature to make a 
point. For example, the critical accounting project went beyond stating that the mainstream was 
not investigating certain problems to claim that it could not investigate those problems because 
of the ontological and epistemological lens with which it approached the world. 
 
“The mainstream world-view has produced benefits for the conduct of accounting 
research with its insistence on public, intersubjective tests and reliable empirical 
evidence. However, it has limited the type of problems studied, the use of research 
methods, and the possible research insights that could be obtained. Such limitations only 
become clear when they are exposed to the challenge of alternative world-views” (Chua, 
1986: 602).  
 
“We argue that the type of research prevalent in mainstream accounting journals, which 
is characterized by a positivist methodological perspective and an emphasis on 
quantitative methods, is incapable of addressing accounting’s complex social 
ramifications” (Baker and Bettner, 1997: 203) . 
 
While it is certainly true that any research paradigm has its limitations, some of the issues that 
have been at the core of the critical accounting project have been co-opted by the mainstream 
literature. Issues such as earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), earnings opacity 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003), and the negative environmental externalities of business (Patten, 
2013) are now the subject of “mainstream” research.  
 
The earnings management literature is concerned with the manipulation of accounting numbers 
to achieve rewards ranging from survival of the corporation and freedom from social 
consequences of actions, to managements’ personal remuneration. In principle, the concerns of 
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this stream of research are consistent with the critical accounting project in seeking to make 
visible the ways in which accounting and accountability are subverted to achieve the ends of a 
managerial elite. Typically in mainstream literature these incidents are presumed to be 
idiosyncratic rather than systemic although this is changing particularly given the recent banking 
crisis (Plantin et al., 2008; Barth and Landsman, 2010). The earnings opacity literature moves 
this concern from an individual company level to a societal level and investigates whether 
earnings management is a systemic phenomenon that affects the allocation of capital across 
different societies. This work ties to a broader concern in the “varieties of capitalism” literature 
with the effect of institutional structures on economic development and the distribution of social 
goods within society (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The mainstream literature on environmental and 
social consequences of business seeks to incorporate externalities into valuation models 
assuming that society, in the long run, is seeking to internalize these externalities as direct costs 
to those who create the problem. The question from an accounting perspective then becomes 
whether or not the disclosure of social and environmental performance affects the firm’s cost of 
capital (Richardson and Welker, 2001). While it could be argued that the emergence of these 
topics in the mainstream literature reflects a hegemonic cooptation of areas that challenge the 
legitimacy of the academic enterprise (Richardson, 1987; Shamir, 2005), none-the-less, these 
examples demonstrate the potential of quantitative approaches to topics important to the critical 
accounting project. 
 
If the mainstream accounting literature is beginning to take on board the research questions that 
the critical accounting project had claimed as theirs and uses quantitative methods to address 
these issues, why has the critical accounting project rejected this approach? 
Emancipation and the rejection of sense data 
 
One important aspect of the critical accounting project is to contribute to the emergence of “what 
could be” rather than focus on “what is”. This entails a rejection of any interpretation of current 
empirical regularities as revealing how society must be or that current outcomes are “natural” 
consequences of immutable laws. As Arrington and Francis (1989: 25) argued: “no amount of 
data or evidence can dictate the conditions of, say, fairness to humans.” Philosophically the 
concern, evident in a wide range of literatures since the enlightenment, is that “man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (Geertz, 1973: 5) and these webs, or 
institutions, limit the life possibilities of people: “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in 
chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they” 
(Rousseau, 1762).  The critical accounting project contributes to the emancipation of society by 
providing evidence of the way that accounting limits or distributes “life-chances” (Dahrendorf, 
1979), the role of accounting in systems of surveillance and control, and the way that accounting 
connects to social identities and subjectivity. Certainly some of these concerns reflect ontologies 
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that many in the mainstream accounting literature would reject and gaining knowledge of these 
concerns may require an epistemology that allows for intersubjective differences in the meaning 
of events. But a concern with “what could be” requires a baseline in “what is” (even if from the 
perspective of specific actors). However, it is clear that current empirical regularities should not 
be interpreted as immutable laws of nature within a critical perspective. What is not clear is why 
the critical accounting project should require the rejection of quantitative methods (as opposed to 
a rejection of positivism6)? 
 
It bears repeating that research methods are tools (Richardson, 2011, 2012). It is how those tools 
are used that determines their value in research. The concern with “methodology” as a strategy of 
research as opposed to “methods” as procedures for carrying out research captures this important 
distinction. The debate about methods in the critical accounting literature is often framed in 
terms of the influential Burrell and Morgan (1979) typology of research paradigms. Burrell and 
Morgan emphasized the empirical clustering of ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions that helped them to organize and summarize the literature. They translated this into 
a four-quadrant model of sociological analyses consisting of functionalist, interpretivist, radical 
structuralist and radical humanist paradigms. The critical accounting project adopted this model 
to differentiate between “functionalist” research and the interpretive and emancipatory research 
that was being promoted (Dillard, 1991; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997). In using this typology, 
however, there was a tendency to objectify the empirically identified clusters of traits as if they 
were necessary conditions for undertaking a particular style of research.  Thus the quantitative 
methods that were associated or correlated with functional research were rejected alongside 
functionalism itself.  
 
The critical accounting project was introduced to the mainstream literature by Chua (1986). Chua 
(1986), although critiquing Burrell and Morgan (1979), follows a similar strategy and identifies 
clusters of assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology and praxis in accounting research that 
she describes as mainstream, interpretive and radical accounting research paradigms. Although 
she also identifies the methods associated with each paradigm, her language provides subtle 
indicators of the weak correlation between paradigms and methods. Under Mainstream 
accounting she observes (in point form, p. 611): “Quantitative methods of data analysis and 
collection which allow generalization favored”; under the interpretive accounting perspective she 
notes (p. 615): “Ethnographic work, case studies, and participant observation encouraged”; and 
under the radical accounting perspective (p. 622): “Historical, ethnographic research and case 
studies more commonly used”. In the cited descriptions of each paradigm’s methods Chua 
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 This essay is NOT a contribution to the extended and continuing debate about the social and moral implications 
of “positivism” (e.g. Malsch & Guénin-Paracini, 2013). My concern is purely with methods regardless of the 
ontology and epistemology within which they are employed. 
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(1986) uses “favored”, “encouraged” or “commonly used” rather than “required” or some other 
term that would signal the normative limitation of methods within paradigms. This is a more 
appropriate view of the connection between methods and various paradigms.  
 
As Morgan (1983) made clear in subsequent work, his intent in Burrell and Morgan (1979) was 
to encourage critical reflection on how research was undertaken rather than to provide templates 
for research: “the call for reflective conversation to improve social research is not a call for 
uniformity so much as to promote improved diversity” (Morgan, 1983: 406).   The question is 
how researchers engage with their subject matter and the choices they make in doing their work. 
Methods are not uniquely related to specific research paradigms but must be used consistent with 
a paradigm’s ontology and epistemology (Bryman, 1984).  
 
The original critical theory work in the 1930s was carried out as part of the Institute for Social 
Research under the direction of Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer rejected both the idea of a fixed 
ontology and universal truths but none-the-less was able to recognize the value of “scientific” 
findings7.  
 
“Static ontology and a universalistic concept of truth have become untenable. For it is 
just as certain that all our ideas the true ones as well as the false depend upon conditions 
that may change, and that the notion of an eternal truth which outlives all perceiving 
subjects is unattainable. None of this affects the validity of science”. (Horkheimer, 
1931/1993: 140) 
 
The rejection of a fixed ontology allows for the existence of concepts that are historically 
contingent and hence subject to change so, for example, the idea that markets achieve socially 
optimum capital allocations is not, from this point-of-view, the “discovery” of a stable truth but a 
claim that must be understood in the historical and social context in which that claim is made. 
The rejection of universal truths allows for the possibility that a claim to truth about markets will 
be evaluated differently depending on the social and historical position of the observer. The 
validity of science, then, is socially and historically contingent but within that context of 
interpretation empirical observations remain useful. This pragmatic vein of critical theory 
became more explicit in later work of the group. 
 
In his remarks on opening the Institute for Social Research in 1931, Horkheimer emphasized the 
value of using archival materials (e.g. government records) and surveys to document existing 
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 This point was reinforced by Hayek (1979:15) in work rejecting the use of quantitative methods in the social 
sciences: “It need scarcely be emphasized that nothing we shall have to say is aimed against the methods of 
Science in their proper sphere or is intended to throw the slightest doubt on their value”. 
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conditions.  This is a continuation of the empirical approach common in Marxist studies since 
Engles’ (1892/1987) statistical profile of the conditions of the working class in England.  But 
Horkheimer did not, naturally, suggest the uncritical use of quantitative methods: 
 
“Each of these methods [archival data and surveys] alone is completely inadequate. But 
all of them together, in years of patient and extensive investigations, may be fruitful for 
the general problem if the permanent colleagues, in constant connection with the 
material, understand that their views must be developed not according to their own 
wishes, but rather according to the matters at hand, if they decisively reject all forms of 
transfiguration, and if we are successful in protecting the unified intention both from 
dogmatic rigidity and from sinking into empirical-technical minutiae”. (Horkheimer, 
1931/1993: 14) 
 
Moore (1991) provides a perspective on the critical accounting project based on his involvement 
in critical legal theory. He notes that the critical accounting project does not reject accounting per 
se: “Critical Accounting has come to praise accounting, not to bury it” (Moore, 1991: 784). The 
basic practice of assigning numbers to transactions and states-of-being is not fundamentally 
challenged by the critical accounting project. The key problématique of critical accounting 
includes what categories are used in financial reporting and performance management, the 
(in)completeness of accounting (and hence the missing categories of contemporary practice), and 
the social consequences of accounting; but the meaningfulness and utility of the social practice 
of assigning numbers to business transactions (i.e., accounting) is not fundamentally at issue. If 
quantification per se as a social practice is not rejected by the critical accounting project, then 
why would it be rejected in critical accounting research?    
 
Quantitative methods are thus not inherently antithetical to the critical accounting project either 
within the philosophy of science, within the specific institutional context that gave rise to critical 
theory, or within the set of social practices that are critiqued by the critical accounting project, 
but it is recognized that quantitative research methods must be complemented with a broader 
theoretical and critical concern with asking the right questions, interpreting empirical results in 
their historical and social context, and combining empirical results with a moral philosophy that 
safeguards against a superficial scientism8. 
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ignoring the over-determination of social phenomena, treating historically and institutionally contingent relations 




The Potential for Quantitative Methods in the Critical Accounting Project 
 
If quantitative methods are not theoretically ruled out of the critical accounting project, then a 
range of potential contributions are opened. My intent is not to provide detailed prescriptions for 
work that can or should be undertaken, rather to suggest some broad strategies for the use of 
quantitative methods in the critical accounting project. These comments focus on three aspects of 
quantitative methods: first, how the critical accounting project can affect the independent and 
dependent variables that are used in quantitative modelling; second, the need to establish 
descriptively the scope and magnitude of the problems that motivate a critical perspective on 
accounting; and, finally, how quantitative methods can be combined with the existing emphasis 
on qualitative research in critical accounting.   
The seven percent solution9 
 
It is widely recognized that models of the effect of disclosure on stock prices explain very little 
of the variation (r-squared in the 5-9% range are common) (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). With 
the availability of large data sets, it has become possible to find statistically significant 
relationships between variables based on small effects. When the purpose of empirical work is to 
test theory, this approach is fine (although a strong inference model would suggest additional 
procedures, Platt, 1964); but if the point is to explain observed phenomenon, then obviously 
much remains to be explored. It is in this space of unexplained variance that the critical 
accounting project could make a contribution. 
 
Different explanations for standard dependent variables 
 
One of the interesting developments in sociology and organizational theory has been the 
recognition that social phenomenon are conditioned by the institutional environment in which 
they are embedded and which they reproduce. The institutional environment, however, is 
pluralistic with multiple logics competing for attention and managers struggling to negotiate their 
way through potentially conflicting demands to maintain the flow of resources and social 
legitimacy (Annisette and Richardson, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). This implies that even stock 
prices are conditioned on multiple logics and not just the market logic on which most 
“mainstream” research is premised. This is important as it means that the use of quantitative 
methods in critical accounting does not need to directly challenge “mainstream” results to make 
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 “The seven percent solution” title is a parody of the Sherlock Holmes novel of this title by Nicholas Meyer (1974) 
in which Holmes’ addiction to cocaine is revealed. I will leave it to the reader to decide if capital market 
researchers’ continued explanation of 7% (+/- 2%) of the variance in their studies is an addiction. 
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a contribution to our understanding, i.e. it is not necessary to show that market logic does not 
exist to show that accounting and market phenomenon are affected by other logics. The role of 
alternative logics and the way that accounting facilitates and transmits these logics into prices 
could be gainfully explored using market data and quantitative methods. 
 
The move to “fair value” accounting standards also provides an opportunity for quantitative 
critical accounting work. As Macintosh et al. (2000) argue, fair value accounting makes 
accounting numbers contingent on market values but market values, historically, were contingent 
on accounting numbers. The reversal of the relationship leaves (some) accounting values devoid 
of any referent (or embedded within a self-referential system). But fair value accounting also 
implies that accountants must be concerned with the processes of price formation and the logics 
that drive that process if they are to incorporate such information into the accounts. They must 
also be concerned with the effect on “fair value” accounting numbers of “distorted” market 
processes, i.e. both traditional market failure issues and the political economy view of markets 
that links markets and social structures (Cooper and Shearer, 1984; Tinker, 1980). These types of 
issues favour a quantitative approach but based on research questions that are more likely to be 
formulated within a critical accounting perspective. 
 
One problem with expanding the right-hand side of the equation to incorporate a wider range of 
explanatory variables is that there must be theory to support the variables included, otherwise we 
end up with “kitchen sink” models with known limitations. These limitations include a lack of 
stability across different time periods or contexts, the need for large samples to operationalize 
(which becomes problematic when some of the variables are not part of standard databases), the 
reduction of variance in the sample in order to find firms that provide all the data required, 
inadvertently including endogenous variables (as a former professor of mine described the 
“problem”, behaviours are just the froth on the economic beer – it needs to be blown off to see 
the “real”, i.e. exogenous, causes), and unclear expectations against which the model can be 
tested. The use of institutional logic theory and post-structural perspectives may guide the 
construction of variables that are required but I do not underestimate the difficulties of expanding 
the range of explanatory variables in a meaningful way.  
 
The use of commercial and/or public databases must also be done carefully within a critical 
perspective. The categories used to populate these databases are derived from a particular 
institutional logic and must be used and interpreted within that context. For example, standard 
measures of “profit” ignore negative externalities but that implies that there should be a positive 
correlation between profit and the extent to which a company or industry has been able to 
externalize or socialize their costs. This is most likely to be evident in longitudinal studies as 
industries fall in and out of favour with political agents who control the regulatory agenda (for 
example, the stability of the Canadian Banking industry during economic downturns has been 
shown to rely on regulatory forbearance rather than the inherent economic or competitive 
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strength of the banks in Canada, Kryzanowski and Roberts, 1993). The construction of models 
and interpretation of results must be sensitive to these institutional details. This skepticism about 
the nature of these databases also opens additional research opportunities that are sketched 
below.   
 
 
Reimagining the dependent variable 
 
I believe that the real potential for quantitative methods in the critical accounting project is on 
the left-hand side of the model.  A key aspect of the critical accounting project is to understand 
how accounting information is related to injustice in society whether this is the unfair treatment 
of labour, the creation of negative environmental externalities or the relationship between 
accounting and social order (e.g. Tinker, 1980). If accounting is implicated in these social 
processes, then it should be possible to demonstrate that these relationships exist on an aggregate 
basis in addition to the case based examples that are often provided. It would seem to me that if 
the issues raised by the critical accounting project are systemic, then they should be evident 
within broad samples. For example, if profit as currently measured incorporates the gains from 
socializing costs (i.e. creating negative externalities that are paid for by society at large rather 
than the company) then one should be able to demonstrate this relationship statistically. This 
would be directly parallel to the idea that stock market values reflect intangible assets that are not 
recorded in accounting numbers (this was captured in Tobin’s q, Brainard and Tobin, 1968). If 
according to critical accountants, accounting is an “interested rhetoric” (Moore, 1991: 786) that 
is connected to particular values at the expense of others, should we not be able to demonstrate 
this in large samples? 
 
The concern to reimagine the dependent variable may extend beyond simple regression models 
to other quantitative techniques such as social network analysis.  Richardson (2009), for 
example, uses network analysis to better understand potential patterns of influence of various 
actors on accounting standards. The use of network analysis is particularly interesting because of 
its potential to use a variety of measures of interaction ranging from interview-based 
identification of advice or reputation networks to archival identification of interactions based on 
market transactions. As will be discussed further below, this approach allows the meaningful 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data. Social network analysis is also useful to identify 
structural relationships that may not be obvious to participants in the process.10 While there is 
great value in understanding practice and the meanings attributed to events by participants, this 
                                                          
10
 This is in answer to a common qualitative research response to quantitative methods: “why didn’t you just ask 
someone?” The question presumes that individuals have complete insight into the conditions of their own 




should not be done at the cost of ignoring emergent properties of social systems or the effects of 
structure on agency. 
 
A final way in which quantitative methods may reimagine the dependent variable in critical 
accounting is to withdraw from model building (even the historically and institutionally 
contingent type described above) and focus on description and categorization. The critical 
accounting project has not done enough to establish the magnitude and scope of the issues with 
which it deals. Engles’ work on the condition of the working class in the UK was powerful 
because of its demonstration of the number of people affected by industrialization and the 
consequences for this large group of people in terms of infant mortality, disease and longevity. It 
seems at times that the critical accounting project revels in finding obscure and rare situations in 
which to demonstrate important processes but fails to establish the contemporary relevance of 
these processes or the costs to society of not engaging in transformation (cf. Sikka and Willmott, 
1997; Neu et al., 2001). We do not have in the critical accounting literature basic estimates of the 
extent and social consequences of insider trading, fraud or the externalities of business. There is 
a need to reengage with basic descriptive work to establish the importance of the critical 
accounting project. For a literature dedicated to praxis, there is insufficient attention to 
establishing the baselines against which a transformation can be gauged. 
 
The types of quantitative data at issue were recognized by Horkheimer and others as different in 
kind compared to those mentioned in the CPA inaugural editorial. Hayek11 (1943: 51-52), for 
example, went to great lengths to reinforce the importance of categorical and descriptive data in 
effective analysis and policy development even if it could not be used to establish generalizable 
results. 
 
“Most of the economic statistics which we ordinarily meet, such as trade statistics, 
figures about price changes, and most time series, or statistics of the “national income", 
are not data to which the technique appropriate to the investigation of mass phenomena 
can be applied. They are just “measurements”… If they refer to significant phenomena 
they may be very interesting as information about the conditions existing at a particular 
moment. But unlike statistics proper, which may indeed help us to discover important 
regularities in the social world (though regularities of an entirely different order from 
those with which the theoretical sciences of society deal), there is no reason to expect that 
these measurements will ever reveal anything to us which is of significance beyond the 
particular place and time at which they have been taken. That they cannot produce 
                                                          
11
 In spite of the differences between critical theory and Hayek’s economic and social theory, there is remarkable 
convergence on the concerns about using quantitative methods to yield generalizable knowledge on which to base 
public policy and on the relevance of “statistics” to capture local conditions. I use Hayek in this context to further 
illustrate the separation between method and epistemology, ontology and axiology. 
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generalisations does, of course, not mean that they may not be useful, even very useful; 
they will often provide us with the data to which our theoretical generalisation must be 
applied to be of any practical use. They are an instance of the historical information about 
a particular situation…” 
 
If, as is often claimed, the categories of mainstream research reproduce the systems of 
domination against which the critical accounting project struggles, then alternative ways of 
categorizing social facts with which we deal are needed. There has been some work towards this 
end, for example, in considering the accounting based on a labour theory of value (Tinker, 1980; 
Webber, 1987; Toms, 2006) or based on a “deep green” perspective on economics (Gray, 1992) 
but considerable work remains to be done.  
 
It is important to reinforce that the suggestions above do not claim or support the view that there 
is an objective reality or that quantitative methods will create generalizable knowledge. These 
suggestions rely only on the historical and institutionally contingent stability and consequences 
of the organization of human activity according to accounting signs. The construction of models 
and interpretation of results must be linked to a theory of systemic domination and interpreted 
within a normative theory of society. 
 
Mainstream research has benefitted from its ability to specify theoretically consistent dependent 
variables. This encourages the development of a cumulative literature in which results and 
methods may be challenged and refined. While these methodological refinements may become 
arcane (as CPA’s initial editorial suggests), it is also part of the process of critique within the 
academic literature that contributes to the “value” (conventionally defined) of academic work to 
individuals and the community. Given the critical accounting project’s commitment to critique, 
this approach should not be seen as anathema. If quantitative methods are adopted within the 
critical accounting community, they will evolve in the same way that rigorous qualitative 
research has generated its own arcane lexicon of ethnomethodology, phenomenology, discourse 
analysis, deconstruction etc. It will however be critically arcane which perhaps makes the 
problem bearable. 
Mixed Methods and the Pragmatism of Critical Theory 
 
Given the commitment of the critical accounting project to qualitative methods, it may be easier 
and more productive to introduce quantitative methods as part of a mixed methods research 
strategy. Sven Modell has written a number of papers on mixed methods in accounting both from 
the perspective of the potential gains for accounting research and the barriers that stand in the 
way. His commentary is primarily concerned with the management accounting literature where 
he concludes that “the barriers to mixed methods research as a way of stimulating dialogue 
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between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’ paradigms are particularly entrenched in the former” 
(Modell, 2010: 125; see also Davila and Oyons, 2008 who suggest management accounting 
research as a fertile ground for cross-paradigm work). Contrary to Modell’s conclusion, as the 
discussion above suggests, the use of mixed methods in the critical accounting literature may 
face its own barriers due to the reluctance by the critical accounting project to use quantitative 
methods. The rationale for mixed methods in the critical accounting project can be justified in 
terms of the, at times uneasy, connection between critical theory and pragmatism (Mertens, 
2003). 
The link between critical theory and American pragmatism (i.e. the pragmatism of Dewey and 
Pierce) is complex (Shalin, 1992; Aboulafia et al., 2002). Early participants in the Frankfurt 
School denounced pragmatism as scientism (experimentation without theory) but Habermas 
(1985: 198) acknowledges that he “for a long time identified … with that radical democratic 
mentality which is present in the best American traditions and articulated in American 
pragmatism.” At the same time, writing on pragmatism has differentiated between “vulgar 
pragmatism” and the “critical pragmatism” that brings more of a political agenda into the 
concept (Cherryholmes, 1992; Ulrich, 2007). At heart, since pragmatism is concerned with the 
consequences of concepts, i.e. how knowledge affects human values and needs, there is a kinship 
with critical theory although without foundationalism. The key connection in terms of methods, 
perhaps best brought out in Rorty (1979, 1982), is the focus on action and practices rather than 
philosophy as a basis for legitimating knowledge claims. In essence, pragmatism and critical 
theory are both concerned with achieving certain normative outcomes and knowledge is justified 
by cultural practices rather than by reference to transcendent criteria. This approach undermines 
attempts to limit methods choice on ontological or epistemological grounds and adopts a 
consensus basis of truth which links the process of generating knowledge to communicative 
action. It is not coincidental that most mixed methods practitioners identify themselves as 
pragmatists (Bryman, 2007). 
Qualitative methods have often been presented as a tool for “theory development” (George and 
Bennett, 2005) which implies that “theory testing” is done with other methods. In part this is 
driven by the need for qualitative researchers to legitimate their work within a system of criteria 
dominated by quantitative researchers but it also signals a concern for “substantive theory” 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1965), which is theory that holds within well-defined boundary conditions 
as opposed to a context-free or formal theory. Mixed methods work attempts to bridge this divide 
(Modell, 2010). Typically the use of mixed methods is regarded as a form of triangulation (i.e. 
multiple perspectives on a single reality) but the more interesting applications of mixed methods 
use one approach to construct, elaborate and interpret the other (Grafton et al., 2011). For 
example, the point has been made by qualitative researchers that most quantitative research has 
an implicit qualitative background in institutional details, concept, variable definitions, etc. The 
qualitative researcher would like to see those background assumptions formalized and explored 
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as a topic of research rather than remaining as a set of unstated assumptions or being developed 
based on naïve qualitative work. Similarly, the interpretation of quantitative results is a 
hermeneutic act that is not fully explored as a distinct research act. Quantitative researchers will 
often use discussions with practitioners in the field as a basis for understanding what the 
correlations are indicating. This re-embedding of research results in practice is made explicit in 
qualitative research.  
So when the statement was made above that we must be cognizant of the institutional context in 
which commercial databases construct their variables, this becomes a question to be answered by 
research. Any critical accounting work that makes use of these databases must interrogate the 
process by which data is collected and categories constructed so that the results of using these 
data can be properly interpreted. This is reminiscent of the literature in sociology and political 
science that questions the nature of “official statistics” while still using those statistics to 
understand macro phenomenon (Hindness, 1973; Bulmer, 1980). Savage and Burrows (2007) 
note that with the increasing capture of social (transactional) data (not to mention the increasing 
use of social media which creates a digital archive of moment-by-moment thoughts) failure to 
develop methods to use these data will undermine the credibility of sociological research. The 
rise of “big data” in modern society is captured in such concepts as Thrift’s (2005) concept of 
“knowing capitalism” and Lyon’s (2001) “surveillance society.” While I would not go so far as 
suggesting that since the data is there, it should be used, but I would argue that if it is there, 
someone will use it and that use will frame public policy debate. If the critical accounting project 
does not engage with these data, the mainstream literature certainly will. 
Mixed methods provide a way to allow quantitative methods to enter the critical accounting 
project without abandoning its roots in qualitative methods. The use of mixed methods also 
ensures that quantitative methods are not used as “empirical-technical minutiae” (Horkheimer, 
1993: 14). When used to its theoretical potential, mixed methods may be the most appropriate 
way for the critical accounting project to (re)engage with quantitative methods. 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this brief essay makes three points. First, the critical accounting project, and 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting in particular, have emphasized qualitative methods to the 
point of making the rejection of quantitative methods an article of faith. This stems, in my mind, 
from a failure to separate “method” as a conceptual category from the way that methods are used 
as a research practice. Second, this methods preference is not an inherent aspect of critical theory 
either in terms of its underlying philosophy or its institutional origins. Rather, critical theory is 
aligned with pragmatism in its willingness to use any method that advances the principles of 
critical theory. Finally, there is significant potential to advance the critical accounting project 
using quantitative methods to explore the unexplained variance in “mainstream” models of 
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accounting phenomenon, to explore specific social and individual outcomes of concern to the 
critical accounting project, or to provide descriptive baselines on the scope and scale of the 
issues of concern to the critical accounting project. 
If quantitative methods are to be used within the critical accounting project, this use must be 
consistent with the key principles of critical theory. Specifically, these methods must be 
complemented with a broader theoretical concern with asking the right questions, interpreting 
empirical results in their historical and social context, and combining empirical results with a 
moral philosophy that safeguards against a superficial scientism. Given the strong tradition of 
using qualitative methods in critical accounting, it is possible to introduce quantitative methods 
as part of mixed methods designs. The concerns of the critical accounting project also suggest 
the need for research into the process of creating the categories and collecting the data that 
become institutionalized as representing market and social phenomenon if quantitative methods 
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2004 15 22 22 1 
2005 10 17 24 4 
2006 4 14 23 5 
2007 6 11 24 2 
2008 10 12 40 5 
2009 1 11 29 7 
2010 2 23 86 4 
2011 11 8 34 0 
2012 4 7 21 4 
2013 15 12 12 5 
Grand Total 78 137 315 37 
Percentage 13.8 24.2 55.6 6.5 
  
                                                          
12
 “Comments” include editorial comments, introductions to special issues, comments on previously published 
work and responses to those comments. 
13
 “Non-empirical” include theory development work (without an explicit empirical component), methodological 
discussions and literature reviews. 
14
 “Qualitative methods” include case studies, historical methods and narrative interview-based papers. The 
separation of case studies and historical methods is arbitrary: work focused on short-duration events were 
classified as case studies while longitudinal work was classified as historical. 
15
 “Quantitative Methods” include surveys, (some) interview based work and statistical analysis of market data. 
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Figure 2: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in CPA articles 2004-2013 
 
Panel A: Qualitative Methods 
     Year     
  
 





Case Studies 4 10 9 8 27 16 48 20 11 6  159 
Interviews 2 7 4 7 6 3 16 9 7 4  65 
Historical 16 7 9 8 7 10 22 5 3 2  89 
Other 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 
Total 22 24 23 24 40 29 86 34 21 12  315 
 
Panel B: Quantitative Methods 
     Year     
  
 





Survey 0 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4  26 
Interview 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  2 
Archival  
Market Data 1 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 1  9 
Total 1 4 5 2 5 7 4 4 4 5  37 
 
